The Moral Significance of the Phenomenology of Phenomenal Consciousness in Case of Artificial Agents.
AJOB Neurosci April 1, 2023 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1080/21507740.2023.2188284 via PubMed
Summary
The paper argues that if artificial agents ever exhibit phenomenal consciousness—subjective, first-person experience—this would carry significant moral weight, potentially entitling them to moral consideration. It explores the phenomenological aspects of consciousness and their relevance to ethics, suggesting that the presence or absence of such experience in AI systems should influence how we treat them. The analysis draws on philosophical theories of consciousness and moral status, concluding that the moral significance of artificial agents hinges on their capacity for phenomenal experience.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The moral significance of artificial agents depends on whether they possess phenomenal consciousness, which would entitle them to moral consideration. |
Abstract
The Moral Significance of the Phenomenology of Phenomenal Consciousness in Case of Artificial Agents.