Phenomenological reduction and quantitative psychology: a conflict in the study of self-consciousness.
Front Psychol January 5, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1650407 via PubMed Central
Summary
The paper argues that phenomenological reduction and quantitative psychology are in conflict when studying self-consciousness. It contends that the methods and assumptions of quantitative psychology cannot capture the first-person experiential structure that phenomenological reduction reveals. The author suggests that this methodological tension undermines attempts to integrate these approaches in empirical research on self-consciousness.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Phenomenological reduction and quantitative psychology are incompatible in the study of self-consciousness due to fundamental methodological differences. |
Abstract
Phenomenological reduction and quantitative psychology: a conflict in the study of self-consciousness.