Neurocentrist identity theory and neuro-phenomenal typing: A commentary on Manzotti's, "The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem fit".
Front Psychol November 15, 2022 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1058325 via PubMed Central
Summary
This commentary critically examines neurocentrist identity theory and neuro-phenomenal typing in response to Manzotti's work on the boundaries and location of consciousness. The author argues that identity theories of consciousness face challenges in defining where consciousness begins and ends, and that neuro-phenomenal typing—linking neural and phenomenal properties—offers a promising but incomplete framework. The piece engages with philosophical debates about the spatial and temporal boundaries of conscious experience, questioning whether identity theories can adequately account for the relationship between brain processes and subjective awareness.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Neurocentrist identity theory and neuro-phenomenal typing face unresolved challenges in defining the boundaries of consciousness, particularly regarding the relationship between neural processes and subjective experience. |
Abstract
Neurocentrist identity theory and neuro-phenomenal typing: A commentary on Manzotti's, "The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem fit".