What RoboMary Knows

Summary

Daniel Dennett argues against the intuition that Mary gains new knowledge when she leaves a black-and-white room and sees color for the first time, a view he first presented in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained. He contends this intuition stems from failing to appreciate the implications of knowing all physical facts. Dennett criticizes defenses of the intuition, devises variations on the Mary case to show how a deduction of color experience from physical information might proceed, and defends his arguments against objections. He concludes that a proper understanding of phenomenal concepts and knowledge shows there is no epistemic gap.

Study at a glance

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter further develops a line of argument Daniel Dennett presented in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained, where he argued that we should reject the intuition that Mary gains knowledge when she leaves the room. In his view, this intuition derives from a failure to appreciate the implications of knowing all the physical facts. Dennet gives a more detailed account of his case. Specifically, he (1) criticizes attempts to defend the intuition; (2) devises variations on the Mary case to illustrate how a deduction from physical information of what it's like to see in color might actually proceed; and (3) defends his arguments against objections. He affirmatively answers the question: could a proper understanding of phenomenal concepts/knowledge show that there is or is not an epistemic gap? He argues that a proper understanding of phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge helps to show that there is no epistemic gap.