Becoming Minded
Buddhist Physicalism? August 5, 2025 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/9780197799697.003.0007
Summary
Evidence from cognitive development and philosophy of consciousness supports physicalist illusionism, the view that meta-cognition involves applying theory of mind to oneself after the fact. Research on children's acquisition of theory of mind and debates about first-person versus third-person mental state attribution inform this account. The transparency of perception is also relevant to the illusionism required by Buddhist physicalism, addressing how meta-cognition is possible.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Meta-cognition involves the subject's post-hoc application of theory of mind to their own case. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter presents evidence from empirical research on cognitive development, as well as from philosophy of consciousness, for a central claim of a physicalist illusionism: that meta-cognition involves the subject’s post-hoc application of theory of mind to their own case. It explores recent work on the child’s acquisition of theory of mind, and the debate concerning whether there is an asymmetry between the child’s mastery of first-person and third-person attribution of mental states. The consequences of this debate for an account of meta-cognition are explored. Recent accounts of the notion of the transparency of perception are also shown to be relevant to the sort of illusionism that would be required by a Buddhist physicalism, insofar as they have direct bearing on the question of how meta-cognition is possible.