Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism

Summary

The paper examines Chalmers's zombie argument against materialism, which claims that if a zombie (a being physically identical to a conscious person but lacking consciousness) is conceivable, then such a world is metaphysically possible, disproving physicalism. By reconstructing the argument, the paper identifies a key assumption: that the epistemic scenario used to verify the zombie hypothesis corresponds to a non-intentionally defined metaphysical world considered as actual. The paper argues this assumption has not been justified without circularity, so the argument remains inconclusive.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Chalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive.

Tags