Metaethical implications of illusionism

Summary

Illusionism claims phenomenal consciousness does not exist, only an illusion of it. This raises a normative problem because phenomenal experience typically justifies moral commitments. The article examines proposed solutions by several philosophers, finding none satisfactory. It concludes with two alternatives: weakening illusionism or accepting antirealist metaethical implications.

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Abstract

According to illusionism, there is no phenomenal consciousness, only an illusion of it. Since the phenomenal character of experience plays an important role in explaining and justifying its normative status, illusionism faces a normative problem. The problem is that illusionism, by denying phenomenal experience, potentially undermines our moral commitments. In this article, I defend the normative problem and consider solutions to it proposed by François Kammerer, Keith Frankish, Artem Besedin, Maxim Gorbachev, Artem Iunusov, and Taras Tarasenko. As I show, none of these solutions is satisfactory. I conclude by offering two alternative solutions that either weaken illusionism or accept antirealist implications for metaethics.

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