On the Relation between the Mind and the Brain: A Neuroscience Perspective
Philosophia Scientiæ January 19, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.849 via DOAJ
Summary
Computational neuroscience offers a new way to address classic philosophical problems, including the mind-body problem, free will, and consciousness. By understanding computations in neuronal networks and the effects of brain noise, the mind and brain can be seen as different levels of explanation for information processing. However, a gap remains in explaining phenomenal consciousness—why experiences feel like something. The proposed explanation is that this feeling arises from a computational process involving higher-order thoughts grounded in the world.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | The mind and brain are different levels of explanation of information processing, and phenomenal consciousness may be explained by higher-order thoughts grounded in the world, though a gap in understanding remains. |
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Abstract
In this paper I show that computational neuroscience provides an important new approach to traditional problems in philosophy such as the relation between mental states and brain states (the mind-body or mind-brain problem), to determinism and free will, and helps one with the ‘hard’ problem, the phenomenal aspects of consciousness.One of the themes of the paper and of my book Neuroculture: on the Implications of Brain Science ([Rolls 2012c]) is that by understanding the computations performed by neurons and neuronal networks, and the effects of noise in the brain on these, we will gain a true understanding of the mechanisms that underlie brain function. Part of the solution proposed to the mind-body problem is that the mind and the brain are different levels of explanation of information processing, the correspondence between which can be understood by understanding the mechanisms involved using the approach of computational neuroscience.But this does leave some ‘hard’ problems, such as the problem of phenomenal consciousness, and while I have provided new suggestions about this in this paper, one must recognise that there is still somewhat of a gap in our understanding of events in the brain and the subjective experiences that may accompany them. The explanation I offer is that when it ‘feels like something’ this is just a property of a computational process that has thoughts about its own thoughts (higher order thoughts), and with the thoughts grounded in the world.