Russellian monism: ignorance and prospects
Asian Journal of Philosophy June 1, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00412-0 via Springer Nature
Summary
Russellian monism, a theory about the mind-body problem, has a deep flaw: its core ideas—what things are made of at a fundamental level and how they produce consciousness—cannot be known. This ignorance weakens the theory's ability to explain anything. The paper compares it to Thomistic hylomorphism, an old metaphysical system that failed for similar reasons. Unless Russellian monism overcomes this problem, it may remain a speculative dead end.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Russellian monism's core elements are unknowable, which undermines its explanatory power and risks making it a sterile metaphysical system like Thomistic hylomorphism. |
Abstract
Russellian monism (RM) is regarded by some philosophers as a promising approach to address the mind-body problem. However, this paper argues that RM suffers from a deep epistemological limitation: its core theoretical elements—namely quiddity (the fundamental intrinsic nature of physical entities) and the factors postulated to explain macro-level consciousness—are unknowable. This dual ignorance undermines RM’s explanatory power and jeopardizes its cognitive fruitfulness. To illustrate the seriousness of such a limitation, the paper draws a methodological and structural comparison with Thomistic hylomorphism (TH), a historically prominent but ultimately sterile metaphysical system. Given that TH declined partly due to its lack of cognitive fruitfulness, a similar fate may await RM. Unless RM can overcome this epistemic deficit, it risks remaining a speculative framework, with little prospect for substantive advancement in our understanding of consciousness or the natural world.