The Intercorporeal Present: Toward a Neurophenomenology of Shared Minimal-Dual Awareness

Summary

A distinctive form of shared awareness called the "intercorporeal present" may be jointly enacted by two people. In this mode, each person's habitual self-narrative quiets while a mutual attentional field forms between them, yet their separateness remains. This is not empathy or coordination but a qualitatively different we-consciousness rooted in ongoing embodied coupling. The authors propose a three-layer taxonomy of we-consciousness: coordination-we, affective-we, and presence-we. They outline a neurophenomenological model predicting reduced default-mode self-narrative activity and enhanced inter-brain synchrony in attention and salience networks during shared presence.

Study at a glance

Abstract

We argue that a distinctive form of intersubjective experience – shared minimal-dual awareness (MDA) or “intercorporeal present” – can be jointly enacted by individuals. In this mode, two embodied persons co-engage in a present-centered attentional field such that each person’s habitual self-narrative falls silent, while a mutual salience‐space forms between them, yet without erasing their separateness. This is not mere empathy or coordination, but a qualitatively different we-consciousness grounded in ongoing embodied coupling. We situate the proposal at the intersection of analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and neuroscience. First, we review Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intercorporeality – the primordial bodily basis of social understanding – and Scheler’s taxonomy of shared affect (emotional contagion, vicarious feeling, and fellow-feeling). This motivates a three-layer taxonomy of we-consciousness: (1) coordination-we (joint actions, turn-taking), (2) affective-we (shared mood/attunement via contagion or sympathy), and (3) presence-we – a hypothesized mode where two minds dwell together in a bare joint field of awareness with reduced self-centered processing. Next, we extend Existential Realism (ER) – a present-centered metaphysics – and a retrieval model of minimal-dual awareness to the social domain. ER holds that only the present exists, while past and future remain causally real but not co-present. The retrieval hypothesis (adapted) suggests that as personal narrative-thinking subsides, a pre-narrative “relational reality” can intensify in interactive contexts. We thus define the intercorporeal present as a shared experiential mode where (i) individual self-referential narration is backgrounded and (ii) embodied coupling organizes attention and meaning, without erasing alterity. We argue that shared MDA is neither a fusion of minds nor mere mind-reading. It avoids the “fusion fallacy” – two subjects do not collapse into one – by preserving the other’s distinct presence even as self-boundaries soften. It also avoids an inference model: shared presence does not primarily operate via explicit theory-of-mind inference but through direct embodied resonance. We introduce the concept of “resonant alterity”: an encounter where the other’s full alterity is alive, yet the usual self-centered narrative does not dominate the relational space. Resonant alterity marks a co-experienced “we” that is real and structured, rather than an abstract fusion or illusion. To ground this phenomenology in the brain, we sketch a neurophenomenological model. Within each person, shared MDA should correlate with reduced default-mode/self-narrative activity and enhanced present-oriented sensory integration (supported by meditation studies showing DMN reduction under mindfulness). Between persons, it predicts selective inter-brain coupling: enhanced synchrony in networks for joint timing, attention, and sensorimotor mirroring (rather than global coupling everywhere).[1] Crucially, our discriminant signature is a “coupled clarity” regime: rising cross-brain synchrony coinciding with dropped self-narrative markers. For example, dyads in shared MDA should show higher coherence in attention/salience circuits (e.g. PFC/TPJ) while EEG/DMN indices of inner chatter fall. We then outline an experimental program. Using dual-EEG/fNIRS hyperscanning combined with micro-phenomenological interviews in dyads,[2] we would compare: (a) solo vs co-presence MDA (Minimal-Dual Awareness) to isolate shared effects, (b) a dyadic MDA condition (e.g. silent mutual gaze or jointly attending meditation) versus a coordination control (e.g. synchronized tapping). We hypothesize that only dyadic MDA elicits the signature (“P1–P4”): greater selective inter-brain synchrony and reduced self-referencing than controls. Subjective reports of a shared “field” should correlate with neural coupling in salience/timing networks, not merely mimicry metrics. Long-term practice partners should show stronger coupling, but even strangers should show these effects if true MDA is achieved. Finally, we address objections. The “fusion” worry (experience is private) is answered by emphasizing relational structure over ontological merge. The “inference” worry is met by noting immediate embodied resonance (as Merleau-Ponty and Scheler suggest). The risk of neural reductionism is defused by a neurophenomenological stance: we use brain data to constrain, not replace, first-person descriptions. We also discuss ethical implications: shared presence might adopt trust and reduce instrumentalizing others, but it does not guarantee virtue; boundaries and consent remain crucial. In conclusion, we propose that an intercorporeal present – a collective, present-focused awareness – is a plausible and distinctive form of we-consciousness. It invites a rethinking of social cognition as including a pre-narrative, embodied “co-presence” mode. If validated, this would extend both phenomenology and neuroscience by showing that the realm of the present (Existential Realism’s ontological core) admits not just private awareness but shared experiential fields. [1] Hasson, U., & Frith, C. D. (2016). Mirroring and beyond: coupling and resonance. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(10), 663–671. Hasson and Frith argue that social understanding involves dynamic coupling rather than static mirroring. Their framework supports the move from individual cognition to relational neural dynamics. This aligns closely with the paper’s concept of “resonant alterity.” [2] Dikker, S., et al. (2017). Brain-to-brain synchrony tracks real-world dynamic group interactions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(14), 1–6. This study demonstrates that neural synchrony can be measured in naturalistic settings. It supports the methodological feasibility of hyperscanning designs proposed in the paper. The work is widely cited in second-person neuroscience.