An analogical abductive argument to assess fetal consciousness

Summary

Analogical abduction, which combines analogy with inference to the best explanation, is used to address whether fetuses at the end of the second trimester are conscious. Applying a three-step recipe for constructing such arguments, and using the best minimal model of adult human consciousness along with evidence about fetal brain architecture, the argument concludes that these fetuses are probably not conscious. The paper also shows the promise and limitations of analogical abduction as a theory-light tool for discovering consciousness across diverse populations.

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Abstract

Analogical abduction is a form of reasoning that combines analogical analysis with inference to the best explanation to address the epistemological problem of other consciousnesses—that is, what justifies our ascriptions of consciousness to other entities? In this paper, I apply analogical abduction to the case of fetal consciousness, focusing on fetuses at the end of the second trimester. I present a three-step recipe for constructing analogical abductive arguments and I apply it to this specific case. I argue that, given the best minimal model of adult human consciousness and the available evidence about fetal brain architecture, analogical abduction supports the conclusion that fetuses at the end of the second trimester are probably not conscious. Beyond this, the paper illustrates both the promise and the limitations of analogical abduction as a theory-light tool for discovering consciousness across diverse populations.

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