Meaning, Alternatives, and the Adjudicative Function: A Distilled SCT Expression
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) May 30, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20464883 via OpenAlex
Summary
Being wrong feels different from ordinary failure because error requires that alternatives were possible. Meaning itself depends on the ability to relate distinctions in more than one way. Cognition includes a distinct adjudicative function that preserves access to alternatives within a meaning-landscape, a role not reducible to truth or utility. The emotional weight of error reflects consciousness withdrawing endorsement from a previously trusted distinction. This conceptual essay proposes a falsifiable architectural claim: if alternative-preservation is fully explained by prediction-error minimization, global broadcasting, or sensorimotor coordination, the adjudicative function is unnecessary.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Cognition includes a distinct adjudicative function that preserves alternative accessibility within a meaning-landscape, which is not reducible to existing frameworks like predictive processing, Global Workspace theory, or enactivism. |
Abstract
Description: Meaning, Alternatives, and the Adjudicative Function Core question: Why does recognized error feel qualitatively different from ordinary failure? Central claim: A system can only be wrong if alternatives existed. Meaning itself depends on the maintained possibility of relating distinctions in more than one way. Cognition therefore includes a distinct function — the adjudicative function — concerned with preserving alternative accessibility within a meaning-landscape, a function not exhausted by the truth or utility of those alternatives. Phenomenological anchor: The emotional weight of error reflects the withdrawal of endorsement from a previously trusted distinction — consciousness transitioning from "yes" to "no" from within. What the paper is not: It is not a metaphysical claim about reality, not a neural implementation, not a formal theory of alternatives, and not a complete cognitive architecture. It is a short conceptual essay establishing a falsifiable architectural claim. Falsification: If all apparent alternative-preservation reduces without remainder to prediction-error minimization, global broadcasting, or sensorimotor coordination, the adjudicative function would be unnecessary. Contribution: A distinct, testable proposal about a cognitive function that existing frameworks (predictive processing, Global Workspace theory, enactivism) do not treat as primary. Audience: Cognitive scientists, philosophers of mind, consciousness researchers, and theorists of learning, error, and deliberation.