Enactivism and Heidegger: a Complicated Theoretical Union

Summary

This article examines difficulties in applying enactivist theory to Heidegger's philosophy and proposes solutions. Enactivism, which rejects disembodied cognitive science for an embodied approach, initially turned to cognitive interpretations of Heidegger. However, theorists became disappointed due to a fundamental incompatibility between enactivism's Husserlian concept of intentionality and Heidegger's approach. Natalie Depraz's non-intentional interpretation of Heidegger's concept of Gelassenheit is presented as a way to overcome these contradictions.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This article shows what difficulties are connected with the enactivist interpretation of Heidegger and what options can be found to overcome them. First of all, the epistemological attitude of enactivism is outlined. This attitued forced the enactivist theoreticians (i.e. Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson) to turn to the “cognitive” understanding of Heidegger. The rejection of cognitivism and connectionism as equally “disembodied” ways of understanding consciousness in favor of an “embodied” approach led enactivist theorists to turn to the phenomenological tradition and, in particular, to the cognitive interpretations of Heidegger. Secondly, the reasons for disappointment in the Heideggerian heritage, expressed by the theorists of enactivism, are considered. It is shown that the main reason for this disappointment was the basic incompatibility of the enactivist approach to consciousness, based on the Husserlian concept of intentionality, with Heidegger's approach. Natalie Depraz' non-intentional approach based on her interpretation of the concept of Gelassenheit is named as an example of overcoming the contradictions that arise in enactivism.