Mind Back to Life
Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia April 18, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.18270/rcfc.4705 via DOAJ
Summary
Cognitivism, the dominant computationalist paradigm in cognitive science, has overshadowed alternative approaches like the Cognition 4E school. This work analyzes cognitivism's conceptual assumptions and critiques its central tenets of representationalism and functionalism. It provides a philosophical justification for enactivism, outlining its theoretical foundations and methodological implications as a promising direction for cognitive sciences.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Enactivism is philosophically justified as a promising alternative to cognitivism, based on critiques of representationalism and functionalism. |
Abstract
The computationalist paradigm in cognitive science, currently known as cognitivism, has exerted a philosophical and empirical dominance that has hindered the visibility and contemplation of contemporary alternative paradigms such as those proposed by the Cognition 4E school. To encourage the exploration of these new theoretical currents, this work aims to analyze the conceptual assumptions of cognitivism and to criticize two of its central tenets (representationalism and functionalism). In this way we hope to obtain a philosophical justification of enactivism, its theoretical foundations and methodological implications as a promising path within the cognitive sciences.