Naïve Realism and Minimal Self

Summary

This paper argues that phenomenological ideas about minimal self-consciousness can improve analytic philosophy of perception. It examines how naïve realism, a contemporary theory of perception, relates to experiential minimalism, a model of self-consciousness from the phenomenological tradition. The author contends that naïve realism is compatible with and can be enhanced by experiential minimalism, specifically by linking the minimal self to naïve realism's commitments to relationalism and transparency.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper defends the idea that phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness can enrich the current analytic philosophy of perception, by showing how phenomenological discussions of minimal self-consciousness can enhance our understanding of the phenomenology of conscious perceptual experiences. As a case study, I investigate the nature of the relationship between naïve realism, a contemporary Anglophone theory of perception, and experiential minimalism (or, the ‘minimal self’ view), a pre-reflective model of self-consciousness originated in the Phenomenological tradition. I argue that naïve realism is not only compatible with, but can be supplemented with experiential minimalism in a novel way. The suggestion is that there are reasons to combine naïve realism and experiential minimalism. My focus here will be on drawing a connection between the notion of minimal self and two core theoretical commitments of naïve realism, relationalism and transparency.