Self-Consciousness without an “I”: A Critique of Zahavi’s Account of the Minimal Self

Summary

This paper argues against Dan Zahavi's claim that every conscious experience includes a minimal sense of self, or 'for-meness.' The author contends that on the pre-reflective level, experience is transparent and involves only one phenomenon, not two. While experience may be reflexive, it does not entail an additional sense of what it is like for me. The author also argues that Zahavi misinterprets Edmund Husserl, who held that consciousness involves self-consciousness but not necessarily a sense of ownership or an abiding self.

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Abstract

Abstract This paper takes Zahavi’s view to task that every conscious experience involves a “minimal sense of self.” Zahavi bases his claim on the observation that experience, even on the pre-reflective level, is not only about the object, but also has a distinctive qualitative aspect which is indicative of the fact that it is for me. It has the quality of what he calls “for-meness” or “mineness.” Against this I argue that there are not two phenomena but only one. On the pre-reflective level, experience is transparent. Conscious experience may well be reflexive (insofar as it is relation to me) but this does not imply that I additionally have a sense of what it is like for me to have that experience. I do not just happen to disagree with Zahavi’s account of pre-reflective experience but, more importantly, I am concerned that he imposes it onto his interpretation of Edmund Husserl. Zahavi claims that when Husserl argues that consciousness is necessarily a form of self-consciousness, he must be committed to the view that we necessarily have a sense of ownership. However, Husserl only claims that I am self-conscious but not that I am a self that owns its consciousness. Zahavi thus misses the novelty of Husserl’s position, namely that I do not need to have a sense of abiding ownership, to have experience.