Attention, Not Self

Summary

A review of Jonardon Ganeri's book 'Attention, Not Self' argues that attention, not a self, explains perception, thought, action, and personal identity, drawing on the fifth-century monk Buddhaghosa's Pāli commentaries. The reviewer contends that the book's target—an 'Authorship view' of self—is too narrow, as Buddhaghosa's texts also support no-subject or no-ownership interpretations. The reviewer questions Ganeri's rejection of impersonalist readings and introduction of 'persons' without clear textual support, while praising the book's novel translation of 'nāma-rūpa' as 'minded body' and its inter-theoretical translation of Buddhist concepts into analytic philosophy.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Jonardon Ganeri's Attention, Not Self is groundbreaking. It shows a way to transform the rich theoretical vocabulary in Pāli commentarial tradition for concepts of mind, consciousness, and conscious states into an empirically informed philosophy of mind. The book is focused on commentaries attributed to a single philosopher, the fifth-century Theravāda monk Buddhaghosa. The title of the book should not mislead one into thinking that it is yet another contribution to the literature on the Buddhist no-self theories or to the literature on attention in philosophy of mind and consciousness. Instead, it is a dense and serious exploration of foundational issues in the philosophy of mind, consciousness, and self with an eye most especially on the role of attention. The book is genuinely cross-cultural and multidisciplinary and is aimed at contemporary professional philosophers of mind. It requires close and careful reading. It needs an appreciation of issues in analytical and phenomenological traditions together with an understanding of the contribution that the sciences of the mind make to the philosophy of mind and consciousness. I found this book rewarding and fascinating in many ways, but I cannot dwell on all its features in the space of a review. One important feature of this book is its rich detail, but that also makes it hard to offer a summary overview. So rather than attempting that, I shall focus on a theme that ties together the narrative of the book from chapter 1 through chapter 15.The main claim of the book is that attention does the work traditionally attributed to the self. Attention replaces self (as the agent) in the explanation of perceptual experience, thought, action, and personal identity. The first chapter does an impressive job of defining the target of the Buddhist no-self theories, which Ganeri calls the “Authorship view” (18). In this view, there is no intelligent agent in the proverbial driver's seat, rather the human being is more like an autonomous self-driving vehicle with various complex “mental” and physical components—perceptual, motor, cognitive, and planning systems—that enable it to navigate its way through the world. This, however, should not be taken to mean that human being is a passive experiencer, a mere cog in the wheel of the cycle of birth and rebirth, deterministically propelled by the law of karma. Ganeri describes Buddhaghosa as offering a middle path between the two extremes of free voluntary actions and purely passive happenings. Intentional mental activity is produced by various mutually interacting components: there is no single author. This view is supported by various quotations and analogies from Buddhaghosa's writings.My concern is that the various quotations used by Ganeri to argue that the no-self doctrine targets the Authorship view suggest that the target is broader and includes the no-subject and no-ownership views (Strawson 1959: 95). In defining the target in chapter 1, Ganeri quotes Buddhaghosa: “There is no inner self which does the looking or looking away” (Buddhaghosa, from Dispellerof Delusion [Vibhanga], quoted at 356). And again, talking about the karmic fruits of actions: “It is simply owing to the arising of the fruit consisting of pleasure and pain called experiences, which is one part of the aggregates called ‘deities’ or ‘humans,’ that it is said that ‘a deity or a human being feels pleasure or pain.’ There is therefore no need at all for another [i.e., separate] experiencer” (Buddhaghosa, from Dispeller, quoted at 164). The no-subject or no-ownership interpretation comes out most clearly in Buddhaghosa quotations used by Ganeri in chapter 15:[The Wheel of Existence] is devoid of any self as an experiencer of pleasure and pain conceived as ‘this self or mind which speaks or feels’” (Buddhaghosa, from Dispeller, quoted at 190);andFor this is said with reference to such feel as is accompanied by clear comprehension of [the question]: “Who feels? Whose feel it is? For what reason do these feels come to be?” Herein who feels? No being (satta) or “person” (puggala) feels? Whose feel is it? Not the feel of any being or person (Buddhaghosa, from Dispeller, quoted at 263).Ganeri does not think that Buddhaghosa favors a no-subject or no-ownership view, but given that such a view is clearly suggested by the texts, it at least deserves some discussion in the context of clarifying the target of Buddhaghosa's no-self view.Ganeri's reasons for ignoring the no-ownership view also become clear in chapter 15. He argues that Buddhaghosa wants to deny the impersonalist interpretation of the denial of self. The textual support for this reading is very thin. Although in the context of cultivation of positive emotions like “loving kindness” and “compassion” Buddhaghosa states that the technique involved is that of “‘identifying oneself with all,’” and on Ganeri's reading this can be glossed as “considering all beings irrespective of social standing or communal affiliation as equal to oneself” (325). He insists that this should not be read as an endorsement of impersonal holism: the point is ethical, not metaphysical (327). The ethical point cannot, however, be considered in complete isolation from metaphysics in the context of Abhidharma Buddhism.Abhidharmikas hold that there is a necessary connection between seeing things as they really are and the realization of the ethical goal of Buddhist philosophy, which is to reduce suffering. The key is to get rid of “wrong views” of the world and of oneself within it.Ganeri is quite clear that the impetus for denying the impersonalist reading is that it turns out to be “starkly disenfranchising” (324). Ganeri's explicit justification for rejecting impersonalism and endorsing a conception of persons as attentive beings is that it fits better with the contemporary political and moral values favored by Buddhist modernists, like Aung San Suu Kyi (324), who see no incompatibility between the Pāli Buddhist values and a conception of a modern political subject as an autonomous individual. The Buddhist modernists and political activists may interpret the doctrine to fit the political needs of society, however, as a philosopher whose work is based on and famous for a close reading of texts, this is a step too far for Ganeri.Furthermore, I find the introduction of persons in this book somewhat puzzling and without any textual support whatsoever. Ganeri asserts, “The concept of person in Pāli Buddhism is a negative one: it is indeed the concept of ‘those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concern with ourselves’ but only by being the concept of attributes concerning which there is no disgust” (303). This definition does not help to distinguish persons from much else, most importantly from selves. Perhaps Ganeri has in mind the Mahāyāna distinction between persons and selves, according to which persons are conventionally, but not ultimately, real; whereas selves are neither conventionally nor ultimately real. That Ganeri does not mention the distinction between ultimate and conventional truths is surprising, given its centrality to the Abhidharma project and its obvious application in this context.To summarize, my main concern with the book is that the target of the Buddhist no-self doctrine, the circumscribed Authorship view is much too narrow. Buddhaghosa's texts support a broader interpretation that encompasses the no-subject or no-ownership views. My suspicion is that Ganeri shies away from embracing the broader interpretation for two reasons. First, Ganeri (2012) is worried by the seeming incoherence of the no-ownership view. Second, Ganeri's aim in the book is to suggest that attention, not self, has explanatory priority in an account of mind and consciousness. The project then is not to deny the self, tout court, but deny that it has explanatory priority in a philosophy of mind. This is then yet another attempt to reconstruct the self and understand it in terms of attention. If this can be done, we can perhaps use the reconstructed self as the locus of value and significance rather than introduce the constructed persons into Abhidharma ontology. In fact, he concedes this much in the introduction: “Attention precedes self in an explanation of what it is to be human, and if there's anything defensible in the concept of self, for example as the expression of subjectivity that is at once experiential and normative, then it must itself be understood in terms of its relationship to attention” (4).One important contribution of this book is to offer a new reading of the Buddhist idea that a human being is nothing over and above an aggregate of nāma-rūpa (naively translated as mental and physical states or factors). Ganeri renders ‘nāma-rūpa’ as ‘minded body’ (18). This is a novel interpretation that provides a sophisticated, nuanced way of thinking about Buddhist theory of mind, consciousness, and persons and that does not run into objections faced by the naive interpretation.Another outstanding contribution is the inter-theoretical translation of the central notions of mind and consciousness in the Pāli Buddhist literature into concepts familiar to those versed in contemporary discussions of consciousness in analytic philosophy and phenomenology.Ganeri masterfully works, in chapters 2 and 3, through the Pāli Buddhist jargon to propose carefully considered equivalents for concepts of mind, sensory contact, various kinds of attention, intention, phenomenal feel, cognitive and conative components of consciousness, and more. This provides the context for subsequent discussions in the book. I recommend these chapters as essential readings for anyone keen on exploring the original Pāli canon. Ganeri's detailed analysis of the components of consciousness focuses on various kinds of attention, primarily those that play a role in cognition and phenomenal consciousness. I think that a similar treatment of the notion of intention, and perhaps other components of consciousness, is also warranted. This is not a criticism of Ganeri's analysis of attention but an invitation to other scholars well versed in Buddhist texts to undertake a similar enquiry into the other concomitants of consciousness, especially intention, phenomenal feel, and kinds of sensory contact. This brings me to another point that deserves mention. Ganeri is very confident that attention has explanatory priority, but I wonder whether intention or phenomenal feel may have similar status.Attention, Not Self is not the last word on the topic of no-self or attention in Buddhist philosophy of mind, but it is the state of the art today in cross-cultural and multidisciplinary philosophy. For those deeply concerned with understanding the Buddhist conceptions of mind, those who want to genuinely engage with other philosophical traditions, and all those who take a stand on the place of mind and human beings in nature, this is essential reading. It not only deepens our understanding of Buddhist philosophy of mind, but also enlightens us on what it means to be human even though we are not selves.

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