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Non-Visual Perception

Casey O'callaghan

The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.3

Summary

Philosophers have disproportionately studied visual perception, potentially missing key features of perceptual consciousness found in hearing, touch, smell, and taste. This chapter argues that focusing exclusively on vision is poor methodology for developing a general account of perceptual consciousness, as claims based on vision alone may not apply to other senses. It provides background for understanding the significance of non-visual sensory modalities.

Study at a glance

Design theoretical or philosophical paper
Key finding Exclusive focus on vision in philosophy of perception is methodologically flawed and risks missing critical features of perceptual consciousness found in other sensory modalities.

Abstract

This chapter addresses perceptual consciousness beyond vision. An impressive reach of human perceptual consciousness is non-visual. From this perspective, it is odd that philosophers have so persistently focused on visual forms at the expense of others. This oversight has potential costs. Nothing guarantees that claims about perceptual consciousness or its phenomenology founded on vision alone generalize to non-visual ways of perceiving. Moreover, critical features may be missed by dwelling on vision. If we are after a general and comprehensive account of perceptual consciousness and its phenomenology, it is poor methodology to focus exclusively on vision. This chapter aims to provide the background that is relevant to understanding and appreciating the significance of varieties of consciousness associated with other sensory modalities, such as hearing, touch, smell, and taste.

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