Ontology of inner-body sensations in the focus of fundamental and applied research

Summary

Interoceptive sensations—inner-body experiences—are a new focus in philosophy because naturalistic theories of phenomenal consciousness now draw on empirical data that require philosophical analysis. This article examines how the concept of interoception has been shaped by different methodological approaches in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, causing shifts in its meaning. It argues that the concepts of interoception and qualia are complementary in understanding the ontology of phenomenal consciousness, highlighting the importance of how inner-body experience is linguistically conceptualized.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Inner-body sensations (interoceptive sensations) have only recently become a full object of philosophy. This is due to the fact that the naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness is expanding by new empirical data and requiring philosophical analysis. Also, the traditional object of cognitive sciences is being transformed into a multidimensional philosophical category. At the same time, the study of the mechanisms of the inner-body experience linguistic conceptualization is acquiring particular importance. This article attempts to reveal the complex nature of interoceptive sensations and to show the dependence of the "interoception" volume and content properties on the methodological limitations of various approaches. The article analyzes the stages of the "interoception" concept formation in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of consciousness, and identifies the causes of semantic shifts this concept content. The truth of the thesis about the complementarity of the concepts of "interoception" and "qualia" in the ontological aspect of phenomenal consciousness is substantiated.

Tags