Embodied Visual Perception. An Argument from Plessner (1923)
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-19585 via DOAJ
Summary
Thatcher's Perceptual Illusion challenges Gestalt Theory by forcing a distinction between physiognomic identity and emotional expression. Helmuth Plessner's Aesthesiology integrates Gestalt insights but goes further, criticizing reductions of phenomenal consciousness to qualia and proposing an embodied-enactive theory of perception. Plessner's analysis of geometry and music as symbolic forms grounded in goal-directed action and emotional expression, respectively, provides the basis for solving the Thatcher Illusion puzzle.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Thatcher's Illusion limits Gestalt Theory's explanatory power by requiring a distinction between physiognomic identity and emotional expression, which Plessner's embodied-enactive Aesthesiology resolves. |
Abstract
Thatcher’s Perceptual Illusion is presented as a case study to test the fruitfulness of Helmuth Plessner’s Aesthesiology for contemporary philosophical and empirical research on sensory perception (§1). In one reading, Thatcher Illusion’s seems to question Gestalt Theory. We argue that it limits ideed its explanatory power, by forcing us to distinguish physiognomic identity from emotional expression (§2). Although integrating Gestalt Theory, Aesthesiology takes a further step into a thorough criticism of contemporary reductions of Phenomenal Consciousness in terms of Qualia: an embodied-enactive theory of perception (§3). Plessner’s insights into Geometry and Music as “symbolic forms” grounded, respectively, on goal-directed action/objects manipulation, and on emotional expression are expounded (§4). The Thatcher’s Illusion’s Puzzle is solved on the basis of this Plessnerian distinction (§5).