Anti-Individualism and Perceptual Representation
Tyler Burge, Carlos Muñoz-suárez
Europe's Journal of Psychology December 5, 2014 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.5964/ejop.v10i4.767 via DOAJ
Summary
Tyler Burge's anti-individualism holds that many mental kinds are individuated by relations to the physical or social environment. Perceptual anti-individualism extends this view to perceptual representation, which Burge argues perceptual psychology assumed without articulation. In this interview, Burge discusses the tenets of perceptual anti-individualism in relation to classic representational theories of perceptual experience, reductive theories of mental content, theories of phenomenal consciousness, and other associated topics.
Study at a glance
| Design | interview |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Perceptual anti-individualism, which Burge argues perceptual psychology assumed without articulation, holds that individuating perceptual mental kinds necessarily depends on relations to the physical or social environment. |
Abstract
Tyler Burge's anti-individualism – the view that individuating many of a creature's mental kinds is necessarily dependent on relations that the creature bears to the physical, or in some cases social, environment – backs his theory of perceptual representation, i.e. perceptual anti-individualism. Perceptual anti-individualism articulates a framework that, according to Burge, perceptual psychology assumed without articulation. In this interview, Burge talks about the main tenets and underpinnings of perceptual anti-individualism in relation to classic representational theories of perceptual experience, reductive theories of mental content, theories of phenomenal consciousness, and other associated topics.