Now is the Time: Operationalizing Generative Neurophenomenology through Interpersonal Methods

Summary

Neurophenomenology integrates first-person experience with third-person neurobehavioral data to study how intersubjective, social, cultural, and historical dimensions shape lived experience. This article proposes updating the approach with a 'generative neurophenomenology' that uses multiple-person phenomenology, measures of interpersonal synchrony, and computational tools. It clarifies three meanings of 'generative' and illustrates clinical relevance through case studies in autism and family therapy, showing translational potential without endorsing computationalism as a grounding hypothesis.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Lived experience is shaped by intersubjective, social, cultural, and historical dimensions. For the past 30 years, neurophenomenology has adopted an embodied perspective of the mind by integrating first-person experiential and third-person neurobehavioral perspectives. Indeed, the neurophenomenology pragmatic approach has embraced an embodied perspective of the mind by integrating experiential first-person and neurobehavioural third-person perspectives. Neurophenomenology reveals mutual constraints between both, as they co-constitute a person’s lived experience. This article emphasizes the intersubjective and social facets of lived experience as well as the readiness of the scientific community to use a "generative neurophenomenology" approach, envisioned in the 1990s by Francisco Varela. For this endeavour, we clarify three meanings of “generative” as it applies distinctly to generative phenomenology, generative passages, and generative models. Then, we propose to combine existing methods to update neurophenomenology program: First, by transitioning from individual to multiple people phenomenology methods that include intersubjectivity experience; second, by expanding traditional neuroscience to include measures of multimodal interpersonal synchrony; and third, by leveraging multiple computational tools to integrate different viewpoints, thereby enriching our understanding of lived experience; We also underscore the potential of diverse mathematical formalisms to capture aspects of human experience, all while underscoring that using computational approaches to model neurophenomenology does not entail endorsing computationalism as a grounding hypothesis of human experience. Finally, we illustrate the clinical relevance of this paradigm through two case studies in psychiatry—(1) with interactive dyads in autism and (2) with multiple members in family therapy sessions—demonstrating its translational potential.