Systems Views of Gender/Sex Require Enactivism: Connecting Fausto-Sterling's Approach to Embodied Cognition to the "Linguistic Bodies" Paradigm
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) May 28, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20402383 via OpenAlex
Summary
This paper argues that the 'linguistic bodies' paradigm from 4EA cognition theory offers resources to distinguish and connect gender structuration, gender identity, and their material dimensions. It critiques Fausto-Sterling's developmental systems approach to gender/sex for its representationalist understanding and proposes expanding the view that gender requires participatory sense-making, linking personal, intersubjective, socio-structural, and material dimensions without representationalist assumptions.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The linguistic bodies paradigm can better distinguish and connect gender structuration, gender identity, and their material dimensions than Fausto-Sterling's representationalist developmental systems approach. |
Abstract
The distinction between sex and gender has been both beneficial and limiting for interdisciplinary research on gender/sex (Shattuck-Heidorn and Richardson 2019; Paulitz 2021; Oudshoorn 2003; Mikkola 2017). In response, alternative conceptual frameworks aim to either overcome or redefine sex and gender: from approaches to bio social interactions (Haslanger 2017) to gender/sex entanglement (Barad 2007; Braidotti 2002) to dynamic and developmental systems approaches (Fausto-Sterling 2012; 2005; Oyama 2000; Prum 2023; Griffiths 2021). In this context, emergent social critical and (trans) feminist work is turning to 4EA cognition theories. This paper supports these modifications of dynamic systems approaches to sex and gender. My main argument is that the ‘linguistic bodies’ paradigm (Di Paolo et al. 2018) can provide much needed theoretical resources to distinguish and connect gender structuration, gender identity, and their material dimensions. Specifically, I look at Fausto-Sterling’s recent connection of her developmental systems approach to gender/sex with embodied cognition theory (Fausto-Sterling 2020; 2021; 2025). Acknowledging the strength of her view, I show that it is limited by its representationalist understanding. Expanding the view that gender requires participatory sense making(Thinius 2021; 2022; Forthcoming), I link personal, intersubjective, socio-structural, and material dimensions without positing representationalist agents in the way Fausto-Sterling seems to imply.