Praxeological Enactivism vs. Radical Enactivism: Reply to Hutto.
Martin Weichold, Zuzanna Rucińska
Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences January 1, 2022 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s11097-022-09841-7 via PubMed
Summary
A reply defends the praxeological enactivist account of pretense against objections from Daniel Hutto, who advocates for a radical enactivist explanation. The authors argue their account has crucial advantages over Hutto's alternative, focusing on theoretical disagreements about the nature of pretend play.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The praxeological enactivist account of pretense has crucial advantages over the radical enactivist alternative. |
Abstract
In his recent paper "Getting Real About Pretense: A Radical Enactivist Proposal", Daniel Hutto raises several objections against our so-called praxeological enactivist account of pretense (Weichold & Rucińska 2022). He argues that one should, instead, adopt his radical enactivist explanation of pretend play. In this short reply, we defend our praxeological enactivist account against his objections, and argue that it has crucial advantages over his radical enactivist alternative.