Enactive neuroscience, the direct perception hypothesis, and the socially extended mind.
The Behavioral and brain sciences January 1, 2015 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x14000892 via PubMed
Summary
Pessoa's The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (2013) integrates neuroscience with enactivism, a cognitive science approach. Both views treat complexity as fundamental to mind and tightly link perception, cognition, and emotion—enactivism through its concept of sense-making. They also argue that mental processes extend beyond specific brain regions and neural connections. An enactive neuroscience is emerging from this convergence.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Pessoa's integrative neuroscience and enactivism both treat complexity as essential, unify perception, cognition, and emotion, and argue that mental processes are not reducible to specific brain regions, pointing toward an emerging enactive neuroscience. |
Abstract
Pessoa's The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (2013) is an integrative approach to neuroscience that complements other developments in cognitive science, especially enactivism. Both accept complexity as essential to mind; both tightly integrate perception, cognition, and emotion, which enactivism unifies in its foundational concept of sense-making; and both emphasize that the spatial extension of mental processes is not reducible to specific brain regions and neuroanatomical connectivity. An enactive neuroscience is emerging.