Idealism and materialism in perception.
Perception January 1, 2015 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1068/p7927 via PubMed
Summary
The authors critique Koenderink's claim that most perception researchers are deluded in believing in an objective reality, tracing it to his metaphysical idealism. They identify weaknesses in his position, namely dualism and foundationalism, and counter with arguments from modern philosophy of science for objective material reality. They contrast Koenderink's enactivism with his idealism and argue that phenomenology and cognitive science are complementary, not mutually exclusive.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Koenderink's idealism is flawed due to dualism and foundationalism, and objective material reality is supported by modern philosophy of science. |
Abstract
Koenderink (2014, Perception, 43, 1-6) has said most Perception readers are deluded, because they believe an 'All Seeing Eye' observes an objective reality. We trace the source of Koenderink's assertion to his metaphysical idealism, and point to two major weaknesses in his position-namely, its dualism and foundationalism. We counter with arguments from modern philosophy of science for the existence of an objective material reality, contrast Koenderink's enactivism to his idealism, and point to ways in which phenomenology and cognitive science are complementary and not mutually exclusive.