Extensive enactivism: why keep it all in?
Daniel D Hutto, Michael D Kirchhoff, Erik Myin
Frontiers in human neuroscience January 1, 2014 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00706 via PubMed
Summary
The paper argues that rejecting mental representation in favor of pure functionalism fails to provide a clear criterion for what counts as cognition. It contends that empirical functionalism cannot adequately individuate cognitive activity, and that commonsense functionalism is undermined by how people actually use psychological concepts. The authors advocate for extensive enactivism as an alternative, distinguishing it from extended mind and distributed cognition theories.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Moving from representationalism to pure functionalism does not provide a substantive mark of the cognitive, and extensive enactivism is proposed as a superior framework. |
Abstract
Radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science oppose the received view in the sciences of the mind in denying that cognition fundamentally involves contentful mental representation. This paper argues that the fate of representationalism in cognitive science matters significantly to how best to understand the extent of cognition. It seeks to establish that any move away from representationalism toward pure, empirical functionalism fails to provide a substantive "mark of the cognitive" and is bereft of other adequate means for individuating cognitive activity. It also argues that giving proper attention to the way the folk use their psychological concepts requires questioning the legitimacy of commonsense functionalism. In place of extended functionalism-empirical or commonsensical-we promote the fortunes of extensive enactivism, clarifying in which ways it is distinct from notions of extended mind and distributed cognition.