The meaning of embodiment.
Topics in cognitive science October 1, 2012 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01219.x via PubMed
Summary
Philosophers of embodied cognitive science disagree about what embodiment means. One view, body functionalism, sees the body as linking external resources with internal biological machinery to support computational circuits that realize cognition. Body enactivism argues that no computational account can explain the role of commonsense knowledge in everyday practical engagement. This paper describes these three views and attempts to reconcile them.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The debate centers on whether the science of embodied cognition can retain the computer theory of mind, and the author attempts a reconciliation of body functionalism and body enactivism. |
Abstract
There is substantial disagreement among philosophers of embodied cognitive science about the meaning of embodiment. In what follows, I describe three different views that can be found in the current literature. I show how this debate centers around the question of whether the science of embodied cognition can retain the computer theory of mind. One view, which I will label body functionalism, takes the body to play the functional role of linking external resources for problem solving with internal biological machinery. Embodiment is thus understood in terms of the role the body plays in supporting the computational circuits that realize cognition. Body enactivism argues by contrast that no computational account of cognition can account for the role of commonsense knowledge in our everyday practical engagement with the world. I will attempt a reconciliation of these seemingly opposed views.