Updating Our Theories of Perceiving: From Predictive Processing to Radical Enactivism
PsyArXiv May 3, 2023 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/x3nka
Summary
The paper argues that predictive processing theories of perception, which model perception as a process of inference based on prior expectations, are incomplete. It proposes that radical enactivism offers a more accurate account by emphasizing the role of embodied action and the environment in shaping perception, rather than internal mental representations. The author contends that perception is fundamentally a skill of engaging with the world, not a process of constructing internal models.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Radical enactivism provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding perception than predictive processing alone. |
Abstract
Updating Our Theories of Perceiving: From Predictive Processing to Radical Enactivism