Debunking enactivism: a critical notice of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism

Summary

A review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism challenges the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. It argues that such a theory cannot distinguish cognition from other bodily engagements like wrestling, questions whether simple robots can model multimodal organisms, and contends that the account neglects how semantically interacting representations are necessary to explain choice and action.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In this review of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice and action.