RADICAL ENACTIVISM AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia September 1, 2018 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1590/0100-512x2018n14105gr
Summary
Self-knowledge of one's own mental states is often explained either as a kind of perception (accessed through a causal mechanism) or as a product of rational agency. This paper proposes a middle-ground view: self-knowledge is an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities, analogous to how sensorimotor abilities ground perceptual knowledge. This account satisfies the privileged access condition for self-knowledge while avoiding an unbridgeable gap between knowledge of self and knowledge of other minds.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Self-knowledge can be understood as an exercise of action-oriented abilities, bridging perceptual and rationalist models without creating an insurmountable gap between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness (one's beliefs, desires, intentions and so on) are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated with self-knowledge without entailing an insurmountable gap between self- knowledge and knowledge of other minds.