Mirror Neurons, Husserl, and Enactivism: An Analysis of Phenomenological Compatibility

Summary

Mirror neuron research seems compatible with a phenomenological view of intersubjectivity, but Dan Zahavi's work reveals significant incompatibilities. Enactivists Thomas Fuchs and Hanne De Jaegher identify problems with mirror neuron interpretations and offer an alternative description of intersubjectivity. This article argues that their enactive account overcomes Zahavi's objections, providing a more phenomenologically consistent framework. The author concludes that Fuchs and De Jaegher should acknowledge their debt to Husserlian descriptions of empathy, and that mirror neuron research should be placed within this broader, phenomenologically-compatible enactive framework.

Study at a glance

Abstract

AbstractThe potential for mirror neuron research to explain various aspects of social cognition has received considerable attention over the past two decades. Initially, mirror neuron research may seem in accordance with a phenomenological understanding of intersubjectivity, but the work of Dan Zahavi will be used to highlight significant incompatibilities between the two. Likewise, the enactivists Thomas Fuchs and Hanne De Jaegher identify significant issues with current interpretations of mirror neuron research and provide an alternative description of intersubjectivity. This article will assess whether the enactivists are able to provide a more phenomenologically consistent alternative to mirror neuron research alone, eventually determining that their enactive account overcomes Zahavi’s incompatibilities. Consequently, Fuchs and De Jaegher should acknowledge their relation to Husserlian descriptions of empathy in their account, and mirror neuron research should be contextualised within a broader, phenomenologically-compatible framework, as that of the enactivists.