Radical enactivism, Wittgenstein and the cognitive gap
Adaptive Behavior October 1, 2014 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1177/1059712314547646
Summary
Radical enactive (or embodied) cognition (REC) holds that some mental activities lack informational content and consist of direct physical interactions with the environment, while other mental activities involve content scaffolded by social and linguistic practices. This raises a cognitive gap question: how do non-contentful behaviors give rise to contentful ones? The paper argues that if REC adopts ideas from the later Wittgenstein, it can deny that any synchronous gap exists in intelligent behavior.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | REC can deny a synchronous cognitive gap between non-contentful and contentful behaviors by endorsing claims from the later Wittgenstein. |
Abstract
REC or radical enactive (or embodied) cognition involves the claim that certain forms of mentality do not involve informational content and are instead to be equated with temporally and spatially extended physical interactions between an agent and the environment. REC also claims however that other forms of mentality do involve informational content and are scaffolded by socially and linguistically enabled practices. This seems to raise what can be called a cognitive gap question, namely, how do non-contentful behaviours give rise to contentful behaviours? In this paper, I show how REC can tackle a certain understanding of this question. I argue that if REC were to endorse claims made by the later Wittgenstein, then REC could deny that there is any (synchronous) gap in our intelligent behaviour.