Social enactivism about perception—reply to McGann

Summary

In a reply to a comment, the author clarifies that their original article did not overlook participatory sense-making theories; rather, those theories are not accounts of perception. The author distinguishes between focusing on the perceptual aspects of social things and the social aspects constitutive of perception in general. The central argument is reaffirmed: the concept of "perceptual practices"—grounded in social practices—is the appropriate way to make enactivism about perception social.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In his comment, McGann argues that in my “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,” I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices” article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of things social, but on the social aspects that are constitutive of perception in general. I conclude by underscoring the central argument of the original article: that the adequate notion to make enactivism about perception social is that of “perceptual practices,” a social practices-based notion of perception.