Making enactivism even more pragmatic: The Jamesian legacy in Shaun Gallagher’s enactivist approach to cognition
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia May 2, 2021 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2021.0002 via DOAJ
Summary
The article argues that William James's non-representational model of direct perception aligns closely with Shaun Gallagher's enactivist approach. By combining James's theories of time and spatial perception with Gallagher's Husserlian-inspired retentional-protentional structure, the authors propose a strengthened theoretical foundation for enactivism that integrates phenomenology and Jamesian pragmatics. This synthesis offers a coherent framework for an enactivist research program.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | James's enactive theory of action and perceptual causality, combined with Gallagher's phenomenology, provides a promising opportunity for an innovative and coherent enactivist research program. |
Abstract
The article outlines some similarities between the perspectives adopted by Shaun Gallagher and William James. In particular, assuming that the issue of representation in cognitive systems provides a valuable starting point and testing ground for verifying James’ possible contribution to enactivism, we argue that there is a considerable degree of similarity between Gallagher’s and James’ non-representational models of direct perception. Furthermore, we propose that by combining James’s theory of time and spatial perception with Gallagher’s Husserlian-inspired theory of retentional-protentional structure, we can strengthen the theoretical assumptions of enactivism, integrating elements taken from phenomenology and aspects of Jamesian pragmatics. Understood in this way, James’ enactive theory of action and perceptual causality provides a promising opportunity for an innovative and coherent enactivist research program.