The Body in Action
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition October 9, 2018 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.12
Summary
This chapter argues that predictive processing and embodied cognition can be reconciled despite apparent conflicts. Predictive processing is often seen as internalist and representational, clashing with embodied cognition's theses: cognition is constitutively embodied, nonrepresentational, inseparable from affect, and metaplastic. However, the chapter shows that this tension is resolvable, concluding that one can accept predictive processing while endorsing all four embodied cognition theses.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | It is possible to accept predictive processing and endorse all four theses central to the embodied view of cognition. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter considers the possible convergence of predictive processing and embodied cognition. It is argued that the embodied view of cognition comprises a subset (if not all) of the following theses: (1) the constitutive thesis, (2) the nonrepresentational thesis, (3) the cognitive-affective inseparability thesis, and (4) the metaplasticity thesis. It is then argued that predictive processing is prima facie at odds with some (if not all) of these embodied cognition theses. The reason is that predictive processing is often understood in epistemic, inferential, and representational terms, promoting an internalist and skepticism-prone view of the mind-world relation. The chapter proceeds to establish that this perceived tension between predictive processing and embodied cognition can be overcome. The chapter concludes that it is possible to accept predictive processing and endorse all four theses central to the embodied view of cognition.