The Extended Body Hypothesis
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition October 9, 2018 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.20
Summary
The chapter examines the extended body hypothesis, which questions whether bodily awareness is confined to biological skin and skull. A weak version, supported by tool embodiment, shows malleability but limits to sensations felt in tools. A stronger version proposes sensations in peripersonal space, yet the author argues that apparent bodily boundaries remain significant.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Bodily awareness has some flexibility through tool embodiment, but apparent boundaries of skin and skull still constrain it. |
Abstract
Abstract According to the extended mind hypothesis, “There is nothing sacred about skull and skin” for our cognitive abilities (Clark and Chalmers 1998). Is this also true for bodily awareness? In this chapter I consider several versions of what we can call the extended body hypothesis. According to a weak version, bodily awareness is not limited by the biological boundaries of our body. In light of tool embodiment, I highlight the malleability of embodiment but also show that there are important limitations to the sensations that we can feel in tools. I then consider a stronger version of the extended body hypothesis, according to which bodily awareness is not even constrained by the apparent boundaries of the body. I will describe how we can experience sensations in peripersonal space, but argue that even then there seems to be something sacred about our apparent skull and skin.