Attention in the predictive mind.
Madeleine Ransom, Sina Fazelpour, Christopher Mole
Consciousness and cognition January 1, 2017 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2016.06.011 via PubMed
Summary
The theory that cognition is Bayesian prediction error minimization has been extended to explain attention as optimization of expected precisions. While this account explains some attention phenomena, it fails to accommodate certain forms of voluntary attention. The authors argue that advocates of Bayesian prediction error minimization are mistaken in claiming it is all the brain does.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The Bayesian prediction error minimization account of attention cannot accommodate all forms of voluntary attention. |
Abstract
It has recently become popular to suggest that cognition can be explained as a process of Bayesian prediction error minimization. Some advocates of this view propose that attention should be understood as the optimization of expected precisions in the prediction-error signal (Clark, 2013, 2016; Feldman & Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2012, 2013). This proposal successfully accounts for several attention-related phenomena. We claim that it cannot account for all of them, since there are certain forms of voluntary attention that it cannot accommodate. We therefore suggest that, although the theory of Bayesian prediction error minimization introduces some powerful tools for the explanation of mental phenomena, its advocates have been wrong to claim that Bayesian prediction error minimization is 'all the brain ever does'.