Thin, Thinner, Thinnest: Defining the Minimal Self
Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture April 14, 2017 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262035552.003.0010
Summary
The author defends a minimal, experientially based conception of selfhood against objections and suggestions from Ratcliffe, Ciaunica, and Fotopoulou. The central question is whether the minimal self is interpersonally constituted; the author argues it is not.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The minimal self is not interpersonally constituted. |
Abstract
What is a self? Plenty of competing and complementary definitions abound. Over the years, I have articulated and defended am experientially based minimal conception of selfhood. In the following short text, I reply to some objections and suggestions for revisions that Ratcliffe as well as Ciaunica and Fotopoulou offer in their contributions to this volume. Is it a viable proposal to suggest that the minimal self is interpersonally constituted? My answer is negative.