Minimal self y las teorías de la identidad personal en fenomenología
Bajo Palabra December 27, 2021 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.15366/bp2021.28.002
Summary
The paper examines the concept of the minimal self, as proposed by Zahavi, for a phenomenological theory of identity through an analysis of coming of age. It first characterizes the minimal self and its premises, then argues that this notion struggles to account for life experiences like illness, age, or gender, which are constituted intersubjectively. The argument culminates in a description of advanced age as a personal discovery of being old, drawing on Simone de Beauvoir's writings.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The minimal self notion faces challenges in characterizing intersubjectively constituted life experiences such as advanced age, which is better understood as a personal discovery of being old. |
Abstract
This paper focuses on the relevance thatthe notion of minimal self, as proposed e.g.by Zahavi, for a phenomenological theory ofidentity. I will do so by analyzing the phenomenonof coming of age. Firstly, I characterizethe notion of minimal self as expressed in Zahavi’sclaims with a view to analyzing premisesand arguments on which it is grounded.Nevertheless, secondly, defending minimalself might pose challenges when it comes tocharacterize certain life experiences that seemto be constituted intersubjectively. In particular,phenomena such as illness, age or genderare not exclusively constituted in individual,solitary experience, but rather they can onlybe ultimately understood by the very subjectin intersubjective perspective. The argument Ioffer in the third step of my exposition, is thedescription of advanced age in terms of personaldiscovery of being old, drawing mainly onSimone de Beauvoir’s writings.