A Not-So-Minimal Self?

Summary

The minimal self, often seen as the unchanging core of experience, may actually have two layers: a stable formal layer and a more robust layer that can change. This paper critiques the idea that the minimal self is immutable by examining phenomenological accounts of schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder. It argues that while the most minimal aspect remains stable across psychopathological conditions, the less minimal aspect is vulnerable to alteration.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper reinterprets the notion of the minimal self, usually iden­tified with the core and experiential self, within phenomenological psychiatry. It criticises the thesis asserting the immutability of the minimal self, positing that this dimension comprises two distinct levels: a more formal, immutable level and a more robust level susceptible to change. In the first section, I show how contemporary phenomenologists identify the minimal self as the experi­ential and core self. In the second, I question the claim of the minimal self ’s invariability by exploring phenomenological insights into schizophrenia and critiques related to borderline personality disorder. Finally, I advance a nuanced distinction within the core self, arguing that while the more minimal aspect remains stable across psychopathological conditions, the less minimal aspect is vulnerable to alteration.