Affectivity in mental disorders: an enactive-simondonian approach
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences September 8, 2023 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09929-8 via OpenAlex
Summary
Affectivity is central to mental disorders from an enactive-phenomenological perspective, where sense-making is inherently affective. Drawing on Husserl's genetic methodology and Simondonian philosophy, sense-making is described as the progressive concretization and structuration of self-world structures that support conscious experience. Affectivity anticipates partial self-world coherence in this process. Different types of affective experiences—existential feelings, atmospheres, moods, emotions—are integrated into this framework, leading to a reinterpretation and classification of schizophrenia, depression, and anxiety spectrum disorders as disorders of affectivity.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Mental disorders such as schizophrenia, depression, and anxiety spectrum disorders are reinterpreted as disorders of affectivity within an enactive-phenomenological framework that integrates different forms of affective experience into sense-making. |
Abstract
Abstract Several enactive-phenomenological perspectives have pointed to affectivity as a central aspect of mental disorders. Indeed, from an enactive perspective, sense-making is an inherently affective process. A question remains on the role of different forms of affective experiences (i.e., existential feelings, atmospheres, moods, and emotions) in sense-making and, consequently, in mental disorders. This work elaborates on the enactive perspective on mental disorders by attending to the primordial role of affectivity in the self-individuation process. Inspired by Husserl’s genetic methodology and Simondonian philosophy of individuation, sense-making is described as the process of progressive concretization and structuration of the self-world structures that support the intentionality of conscious experiences. Accordingly, affectivity is described as the force that anticipates a partial self-world coherence in sense-making. Structurally different types of affective experiences are integrated into the genetic picture and, on this basis, a reinterpretation and classification of certain mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, depression, and the anxiety spectrum, is provided. In this way, this work contributes to a phenomenologically informed enactive account of mental disorders as disorders of affectivity.