Coevolutionary Dynamics of Costly Bonding Ritual and Altruism
bioRxiv Preprint Server June 24, 2016 preprint DOI: 10.1101/060624 via bioRxiv
Summary
Altruistic behavior and bonding among cooperators are common in animals, but how such behaviors evolve genetically remains debated. Costly ritualized movements may trigger or maintain altruistic sentiments by engaging pre-existing behavioral instincts. This paper models the genetic coevolution of such rituals and altruism, finding that altruism can become fixed in a population or cycle over time, depending on the balance of costs and benefits. When cycling occurs, altruism persists but population mean fitness declines with the introduction of bonding rituals.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key finding | Coevolution of costly ritualized behavior and altruism can lead to fixation of altruism or cycling, with population mean fitness declining when cycling occurs. |
Abstract
While altruistic behavior and bonding in altruistic pairs or groups of cooperators is observed throughout the animal kingdom, the genetic evolution of such is on an ongoing source of debate, curiosity, and conflict in the behavioral sciences. Many such bonded groups and pairs are observed to take part in costly ritualized movement behavior that is hypothesized to trigger or maintain altruistic sentiments amongst the participants. Such costly ritualized practices could have evolved if they engaged pre-existing behavioral instincts that manifest as altruism in the new context of ritual bonding. While this seems at first to be a ‘Green Beard’ hypothesis (‘marker (ie., ‘green beard’) as honest signal of altruistic intent', an hypothesis well-known to be problematic), it is distinct in two important ways. First, the ritual as marker is costly, and second the ritual engages a pre-existing behavioral potential caused by genes which, importantly, have some other benefit. This paper models the genetic coevolutionary dynamics both analytically and through simulation. It finds that such coevolution can lead to fixation of altruism in a population or to cycling of altruism in the population, depending on the balance of costs and benefits. Where cycling occurs, even though altruism is consistently present in the population, population mean fitness declines with the introduction of these bonding rituals.