Reflections on Reductionist Clinical Psychological and Neuroscience Education: Putting the “Me” Back in Mental Disorders
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Cognitive Science January 1, 2026 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.70021 via OpenAlex
Summary
Neuroscientific methods have heavily shaped public perception of clinical psychology, but their contribution to understanding human psychology and the self is limited. This article reviews the shortcomings of a psychopharmacological approach to mental disorders and proposes a psychological model where current neuroscientific research describes symptoms, not causes. The model aligns with network theories of disorders and emphasizes the Pattern Theory of the Self, arguing that disruptions to the psychological self are central to mental disorders. The author calls for reconsidering the philosophical foundations of clinical psychology and neuroscience to develop more effective interventions.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Reductionism Extant taxon Psychological intervention Perception Psychological research |
| Key finding | Neuroscientific research describes symptoms, not causes, of mental disorders; disruptions to the psychological self are a central etiological factor. |
Abstract
The public perception of clinical psychology has been heavily influenced by neuroscientific methods over the past several decades. However, we have seldom stopped to consider to what extent neuroscience can contribute to our understanding of how human psychology-including our experience of our psychological self-operates. This article reviews the progress and weaknesses of an extant psychopharmacological approach to psychological disorders. A psychological model is developed, which positions current neuroscientific research as describing symptoms, rather than causes, of mental disorders. This model relates closely to network theories of psychological disorders, with a strong emphasis on the Pattern Theory of the Self, where disruptions to the psychological self are a central etiological factor in mental disorders. In doing so, this article argues that the philosophical underpinnings of clinical psychological and neuroscientific research should be reconsidered if we intend to develop effective interventions for mental disorders. This article is contextualized in the author's experience of psychological and neuroscientific training, as well as subsequent research experience as a neuroscientist. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Theory and Methods Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Neuroscience > Clinical.