Body social models of disability: Examining enactive and ecological approaches.

Summary

Disability may be better understood through an ecological functional model that focuses on how individual functionality intersects with contributions to group and collective functioning, offering an alternative to both social-relational and medical models. Enactivist relational models of disability, while challenging the orthodox medical model, remain problematically committed to an individualist methodology, facing both theoretical and practical issues in intervention strategies. For a genuinely relational approach, enactivists should adopt a neurodiversity paradigm and the ecological functional model proposed by Robert Chapman.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Autistic philosopher and neurodiversity proponent Robert Chapman (2021) argues that disability may be best understood by utilizing an ecological functional model where the focus is on the intersection and overlaps between relational contributions to collectives and group functioning with individual functionality. This presents an alternative to both social-relational models of disability advocated by other neurodiversity proponents and the orthodox medical model of disability. While enactivists such as Michelle Maiese and Juan Toro, Julian Kiverstein and Erik Rietveld have also offered relational models of disability that challenge the orthodox medical model, I argue that unlike the ecological functional model, these enactivist models remain problematically committed to an individualist methodology. Drawing on what Miriam Kyselo has labeled the body social problem, I show that the enactivist models not only face theoretical issues, but also practical issues in terms of their recommended intervention strategies for disability. I argue that for these reasons, if enactivists want a relational model of disability, then they should adopt both a neurodiversity paradigm approach and Chapman's ecological functional model.