Putting down the revolt: Enactivism as a philosophy of nature.

Summary

Enactivists claim their approach will replace cognitivism as the dominant paradigm in cognitive science. This paper examines their arguments and finds them unconvincing. The 'hard sell'—that enactivism reveals a critical explanatory gap in cognitivism—fails because cognitivism faces no internal crisis, and enactivism does not offer inherently better explanations. The 'soft sell'—that enactivism provides a more attractive or parsimonious lens—rests on a misunderstanding of how scientific theories are selected. Instead, the authors support viewing enactivism as a philosophy of nature, which integrates scientific questions into a cohesive picture rather than supporting a single research paradigm.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Enactivists frequently argue their account heralds a revolution in cognitive science: enactivism will unseat cognitivism as the dominant paradigm. We examine the lines of reasoning enactivists employ in stirring revolt, but show that none of these prove compelling reasons for cognitivism to be replaced by enactivism. First, we examine the hard sell of enactivism: enactivism reveals a critical explanatory gap at the heart of cognitivism. We show that enactivism does not meet the requirements to incite a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense—there is no internal crisis in cognitivism. Nor does it provide inherently better explanations of cognition as some have claimed. Second, we consider the soft sell of enactivism: enactivism provides a more attractive, parsimonious, or clear-eyed lens on cognition. This move proves to boil down to a misunderstanding of how theories are selected in science. Instead we lend support to a broader and more desirable way to conceive of enactivism, the recent proposal that enactivism is a philosophy of nature . We explain how a philosophy of nature does more than support a single research paradigm by integrating scientific questions into a cohesive picture.