On Radical Enactivist Accounts of Arithmetical Cognition

Summary

The paper evaluates whether a radically enactive (embodied) account of cognition, which rejects mental representations for basic minds, can explain arithmetical cognition. It first examines whether empirical data on evolutionarily developed proto-arithmetical abilities support this view, concluding that while more research is needed, the radical enactivist position can be developed consistently with current evidence. It then addresses whether this account can explain the objectivity of arithmetical knowledge, arguing against a realist interpretation and instead proposing that objectivity arises from universal proto-arithmetical abilities that shape the development of arithmetical cognition.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Hutto and Myin have proposed an account of radically enactive (or embodied) cognition (REC) as an explanation of cognitive phenomena, one that does not include mental representations or mental content in basic minds. Recently, Zahidi and Myin have presented an account of arithmetical cognition that is consistent with the REC view. In this paper, I first evaluate the feasibility of that account by focusing on the evolutionarily developed proto-arithmetical abilities and whether empirical data on them support the radical enactivist view. I argue that although more research is needed, it is at least possible to develop the REC position consistently with the state-of-the-art empirical research on the development of arithmetical cognition. After this, I move the focus to the question whether the radical enactivist account can explain the objectivity of arithmetical knowledge. Against the realist view suggested by Hutto, I argue that objectivity is best explained through analyzing the way universal proto-arithmetical abilities determine the development of arithmetical cognition.