The dynamic entanglement of bodily and cognitive aspects of skill: Assimilation or processual coalescence?

Summary

Expert performance in real-world settings involves fluidly blending multiple types of competencies. A review of skill theories in the motor domain reveals that cognitivist approaches emphasize conceptual and knowledge-based control, while 4E cognition theories stress sensorimotor coupling; both are too limited alone but complementary. Different mechanisms—such as sensorimotor cognition, body reflexivity, action imagery, strategic control, and declarative knowledge—become dynamically entangled in skilled behavior. To study this interfacing, high-grainsize qualitative process analysis ('coalescence analysis') is needed. The author argues against attempts to assimilate higher cognition into sensorimotor frameworks, instead endorsing a view of functional integration where higher cognition is treated on its own terms yet dynamically embedded in embodied couplings.

Study at a glance

Abstract

A striking feature of expert performance "in the wild" is how experts fluidly mesh or alternate between multiple kinds of competencies. To do justice to this fact, both, an integrative theory and methodology are called for. My first task is to provide a review of different theory frameworks of skills in the motor domain, which reveals great differences of emphasis. While cognitivist approaches stress conceptual, inferential and knowledge-based control mechanisms "4E" cognition theories emphasize sensorimotor coupling and interaction-based control. I argue that both views are in themselves too limited, yet in many ways complementary. Second, I survey ways in which different mechanisms become dynamically entangled in skilled behavior: sensorimotor cognition frequently is shaped by and in turn shapes body reflexivity, action imagery, strategic control, action principles, meta-cognition, declarative knowledge, creative ideation, and discursive learning. My third task is to clarify how to approach the interfacing and integration of different mechanisms from a methodological standpoint. High-grainsize qualitative forms of process analysis are needed to elucidate how mechanisms are inter-orchestrated as they constrain each other or synergize ("coalescence analysis"). Fourth, the dynamic entanglement of mechanisms raises questions about the ontological relationship of so-called "lower" and "higher" cognition. Dynamic systems, enactive, ecological, and minimal cognition views have made a bid for ontological assimilation, trying to scale up sensorimotor to higher cognition. I argue against this approach, which suffers from an overly sparse notional apparatus and limited empirical scope. The presently endorsed view focuses on functional integration. Higher cognition is treated on its own terms, yet also as dynamically embedded in embodied couplings, a view that takes inspiration from situated and distributed cognition.