The nature of the chemical senses
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences May 27, 2026 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2026.12306 via OpenAlex
Summary
Smell and taste, unlike vision, touch, and hearing, are directly oriented toward stuffs rather than individual objects. Stuff constitutes an irreducible ontological category distinct from both individuals and universals. Chemistry itself is best understood as a science of stuffs rather than of atoms or molecules. The distinctive phenomenology of smell and taste—including mixture, concentration, and the sense of presence—is best explained by a stuff theory of their proper objects. This view has implications for how to individuate the senses of smell and taste.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Phenomenology philosophy Taste Philosophy of science Intentionality Metaphysics |
| Key finding | Smell and taste are directly oriented toward stuffs, which constitute an irreducible ontological category, and this stuff theory best explains the distinctive phenomenology of these senses. |
Abstract
This paper defends a stuff theory of the chemical senses: smell and taste, unlike vision, touch, and hearing, are directly oriented toward stuffs rather than individual objects. I first argue that stuff constitutes an irreducible ontological category — distinct from both individuals and universals. I then contend, drawing on recent anti-reductionist work in the philosophy of chemistry, that chemistry itself is best understood as a science of stuffs rather than of atoms or molecules. Finally, building on my earlier work (Mizrahi 2014), I show that the distinctive phenomenology of smell and taste — including mixture, concentration, and the sense of presence — is best explained by a stuff theory of their proper objects. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this view for the long-standing question of how to individuate the senses of smell and taste.