Psychopathology of the bodily self and the brain: the case of schizophrenia.

Summary

This review examines recent evidence on the neurobiological basis of the bodily self—a minimal sense of self tied to the body and its motor capabilities. The authors show how the body and its potential for movement relate to this minimal self, and argue that this perspective can illuminate self-disturbances and social deficits in schizophrenia. They compare their approach with other views on the neural correlates of self-disturbances in schizophrenia and propose that cognitive neuroscience can now address classic psychopathological topics by linking first-person experiential aspects of psychiatric diseases to their neurobiological foundations.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In the present paper, we review the recent empirical evidence on the neurobiological basis of a minimal notion of the self, the bodily self. We show the relationship between the body, its motor potentialities and the notion of minimal self. We argue that this approach can shed new light onto self-disturbances and social deficits characterizing schizophrenia. We discuss our approach with other views on the neural correlates of self-disturbances in schizophrenia and propose that cognitive neuroscience can today address the classical topics of psychopathology by adding a new level of description, finally enabling the correlation between the first-person experiential aspects of psychiatric diseases and their neurobiological roots.